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Metacognitive Experiences – Taking Account of Feelings in Early Years Education 
The terms metacognitive experience and early years’ education fit uneasily together. There is plenty 
of work now on metacognition and self regulated learning in the early years and much of this will 
include reference to children’s experience as a crucial factor in the development of both.  However, 
there is little which focuses specifically on metacognitive experiences in the early years. In order to 
understand why this might be we need first to consider the development of the field of research 
which comes under the metacognition umbrella. 
Foundations of metacognition lie in cognitive theories of memory (Cavanaugh & Borkowski, 1980; 
Hart, 1992); and on what children believe, understand and can articulate about memory and 
remembering, otherwise known as metamemory (Flavell & Wellman, 1977). Flavell and Brown 
(Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1976) extended the research on memory to include reflection on other 
cognitive processes, thereby creating the term “metacognition”.  The focus was often on the 
developmental stages from early childhood to adulthood of this ability. This was hardly surprising 
given Flavell’s background as a Piagetian. It seemed reasonable to extend Piaget’s cognitive stage 
development model to include children’s beliefs, knowledge and understanding of their own 
cognitive processes. The notion of metacognition as akin to Piaget’s reflective abstraction (Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1969) leads to the view that until children reach the level of formal operational thought 
they are unable to engage in metacognition. This was the consensus view of most research into 
metacognition until more recently when empirical studies of young children demonstrating a variety 
of metacognitive processes (Blair & Razza, 2007; Garrett, Mazzocco, & Baker, 2006; Jacobs, 2004; 
van der Zee, Hermans, & Aarnoutse, 2006) and a number of studies of non human animals (without 
language) also demonstrating metacognition (Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007; Premack & Woodruff, 
1978; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003) began to change this view. Theory of Mind research has 
shown that by the age of four children are able to understand that people think differently 
depending on the experience and knowledge they already have.  My own research with five and six 
year olds used a constructivist theory of mind test (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996); a metamemory 
test; a mental rotation test (Estes, 1998) and a self as learner test to confirm that children of this age 
could not only articulate their understanding of their own cognitive processes but could also talk 
about their development as thinkers and the conditions under which they might think better (Larkin, 
2010). The most sophisticated views of these five year olds showed that they saw learning as an 
active process in which they had to engage their brain and which requires practice. They described 
the importance of asking questions and demonstrated their understanding of learning as a complex 
activity involving observing, practising, acting, talking, working things out individually, and using 
what they already know. They also articulated the difference between observing, remembering and 
learning. They spoke of remembering and forgetting as emotional experiences with forgetting often 
linked to sadness (Larkin, 2007). 
Flavell’s model of metacognition as delineated in the seminal article Metacognition and Cognitive 
Monitoring (Flavell, 1979)comprises four “classes of phenomena” described as “metacognitive 
knowledge; metacognitive experiences; goals (or tasks); and actions (or strategies). In general, most 
research on metacognition in education has concentrated on the different aspects of metacognitive 
knowledge (person, task, strategy) including how these are facilitated and how they impact on 
learning or attainment or research has focussed on the “on-line” regulation of cognitive processes as 
outlined in an equally seminal paper, (Nelson & Narens, 1992). However, the second of Flavell’s four 
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“classes of phenomena” – metacognitive experiences was largely ignored in educational research 
until the 1990s. However, the affective aspects of memory and learning have long been a part of the 
research agenda of cognitive psychologists interested in monitoring and control of cognition and 
memory.  It is this branch of cognitive psychology which has investigated such phenomena as 
judgements of learning (JOL); ease of learning (EOL); feelings of confidence, familiarity and 
uncertainty; tip of the tongue experiences (TOT); feelings of knowing (FOK); and their determinants, 
cues, calibration and accuracy. For instance experimental studies show that pre-school children tend 
to be over-confident about the accuracy of their memory; whereas older school age children provide 
more accurate predictions (Schneider & Pressley, 1997). Yet whilst educationalists would agree that 
learning is replete with emotion as well as cognition, they have been slow to investigate the 
affective aspect of metacognition in classroom based studies. This may be because the adoption of 
metacognition theory into thinking skills interventions has often led to a skills based approach to 
facilitating and developing children’s metacognition in different curriculum subject areas. (For a 
review of thinking skills programmes see (Higgins, Hall, Baumfield, & David Moseley, 2005). In the 
majority of these programmes the cognitive rather than the affective domain is the focus. 
Metacognitive Experiences:  Definitions 
Metacognitive experiences are defined by Flavell  (1979) as “conscious cognitive or affective 
experiences that accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise” (pg 906). Flavell is clear that 
metacognitive experiences include both cognitive and affective states and arise from the activation 
of metacognitive knowledge in response to a task. There is an interactive process between the 
activation of metacognitive knowledge which can cause a metacognitive experience and the 
activation of metacognition to interpret these experiences. For example during a task, knowledge of 
previous similar tasks may be consciously cued in order to aid progress on the current task or a task 
may cause a feeling of puzzlement which may cue metacognitive knowledge of similar incidents in 
order to interpret the feeling. Metacognitive experiences include feelings of confidence and 
puzzlement; monitoring of progress and judgements of success or failure including the feelings 
which accompany them. Whether conscious or not metacognitive experiences can influence 
progress on a task and lead to new and better processing; to revision of existing processes or to 
abandonment of the tasks.  From a constructivist perspective on learning just as experience and 
interaction with the world leads to construction of new knowledge; so these meta -level experiences 
focussed on cognitive processes leads to the construction and revision of metacognitive knowledge. 
For Flavell metacognitive experiences in childhood are crucial for the development of metacognitive 
knowledge. However, just as children may gain inaccurate or false knowledge of the world from 
experience so they can develop unhelpful metacognitive knowledge of themselves as learners from 
the handling and resolution of metacognitive experiences. 
Metacognitive experiences give rise to cognitive strategies and play a part in monitoring cognition 
through the interaction of metacognitive strategies, metacognitive knowledge and task goals. 
Metacognitive experiences are replete with emotion and highly personal as they are influenced by 
past and present experiences and self concept. Efklides (2001) views metacognitive experiences as 
influenced by three factors: 1) personal which includes ability, self concept and personality; 2) task 
which includes the nature of the task, previous experiences of similar tasks 3) metacognitive 
knowledge which includes conscious understanding and knowledge of how person, task and strategy 
variables might impact on task or goal. Metacognitive experiences are seen as the implicit and 
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explicit feelings which accompany learning and readiness to learn and which in turn influence task 
progression through the activation of monitoring and control processes and the activation of 
strategies. Efklides describes metacognitive experiences as on-line metacognition ie. feelings which 
happen in the moment, which change as the task goes on and which reoccur before, during and 
after a task. They can include ideas – light bulb moments; feelings of familiarity, difficulty, 
confidence, puzzlement; judgements and evaluations of strategies being used and predictions of 
success or failure. In this model metacognitive experiences are closely linked to self concept and 
motivation. Metacognitive experiences are both influenced by self concept and help to construct self 
concept through feedback (Dermitzaki & Efklides, 2001). Metacognitive experiences are seen as the 
interface between the person and the task (Efklides, 2006). As such they are particularly important 
elements in the creation of life-long and self regulated learners, yet they are often overlooked in 
classrooms.  
Metacognitive Experiences in Early Years  
Whilst the age at which metacognition develops in human infants has caused controversy amongst 
cognitive psychologists and educationalists, developmental psychologists have long been aware 
through experimental studies on infants that early signs of metacognition are in the affective rather 
than the cognitive domain. Studies on babies’ attention seeking behaviour have shown that as young 
as 6 months old children respond to the affective state of another even when the emotion is not 
directed at themselves, (Reddy, 2001, 2003). The suggestion is that these very young children can 
demonstrate affective metacognition which is not yet cognitive. Esken (2012) discusses the work on 
children’s social awareness and embarrassment which shows that by two years old children exhibit 
embarrassment indicating both an ability to view their own behaviour in relation to a social norm 
(Lewis, 2003) and an ability to see how others might perceive them (Lewis, 2003; Rochat, 2004).  
Esken (2012) goes on to suggest that there are two types of embarrassment which link to 
metacognitive experiences.  Firstly the non-evaluative kind is a feeling of being uncomfortable as the 
centre of attention.  It does not include any conscious understanding or reflection on the feeling and 
therefore could not be considered metacognitive. Secondly the evaluative type which includes a 
conceptual awareness of how others may be evaluating the behaviour and includes a self evaluation. 
Esken argues that the non-evaluative emotion may occur in non-human animals but the evaluative 
emotion involves a reflective consciousness and can be seen as an early step in the development of 
metacognition in children. As children experience more of the world around them they develop an 
ability to regulate and control their first order emotional responses in relation to emotions such as 
embarrassment. This self regulation and control is facilitated by inner speech. From a Vygotskyan 
perspective it could be that the child is gradually internalizing the language of the caregiver which is 
directed at the regulation and control of emotions. Thus the development of metacognition can be 
viewed as fundamentally a social process (Wertsch, 1978). The suggestion is that metacognition 
develops from an inter-psychological to an intra-pyschological domain (Vygotsky, 1978). 
Borkowski and Thorpe (1994) demonstrated how interaction between children and adults affects the 
development of cognition, metacognition and motivation. In this model of metacognition 
importance is placed on the development of a positive sense of self which includes an internal locus 
of control, self esteem, resilience and positive motivational attributions. It seems likely that the early 
emotional experiences of young children will impact on the regulation and control of cognition. The 
development of these executive functions as measured by executive function tasks appears to be 
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closely linked to the development of theory of mind as measured by theory of mind tasks. Thus 
children around 4-5 years of age are able to pass both kinds of tests (Esken 2012). Theory of mind 
involves the understanding of others and their intentions and thus the link between theory of mind 
and metacognition seems to be clear. However, research on pretend play has shown that this 
seemingly obvious link between the development of theory of mind and the development of 
metacognition may not be so clear cut. The two competing claims that pretend play shows evidence 
of theory of mind and that pretend play is behaviourist in nature requiring only that children imitate 
behaviour without needing to engage in meta-representational beliefs have long dominated this 
area of research.  However,  Brandl (2012) suggests that there is a middle (although difficult and 
complex) ground between these two extremes. This middle ground theory emphasises the role 
played by metacognitive feelings. Brandl distinguishes between metacognitive judgements such as 
feeling of knowing, confidence judgements and feelings of uncertainty which require both the 
feeling and an evaluation of the feeling; and metacognitive feelings which may draw attention to an 
internal state without making a judgement about it. In this sense metacognitive feelings could be 
deemed non conceptual.  Brandl argues that children gain a pleasurable sense of freedom from 
pretend play and that their social ability enables them to recognise the intention of others to engage 
in similar pleasurable activity. The argument is that by understanding the intentions of others 
children are able to recognise their own intentions and in turn their developing self awareness 
would make children more able to understand the intentions of others. Thus the metacognitive 
feelings of pleasure and freedom form part of a socially generated feedback loop which may account 
for developing metacognitive abilities. Whilst Brandl’s theory is yet to be supported by weighty 
empirical evidence the argument is a convincing one especially when compared to anecdotal 
experiences of observing young children’s ability to understand pretend from the slightest of 
behavioural cues. Metacognitive feelings then, rather than theory of mind may be crucial for the 
development of metacognition.  
Metacognitive experiences are often transitory. They are different for different people and they are 
sensitive to contextual cues. They can go unrecognised, be ignored, have a negative effect on 
progress or they can be used to help us understand more about ourselves as learners in different 
contexts, (Efklides, 2006). Whilst some elements of metacognition such as non- evaluative 
metacognition and theory of mind develop alongside cognitive development, other aspects such as 
the metacognitive knowledge base and the ability to regulate and control thinking need to be 
consciously facilitated and fostered. It is likely that recognising and making use of our metacognitive 
experiences also requires some support. Whilst learning is replete with emotional responses, little 
attention is paid in educational settings in how to make use of those responses and how to learn 
from them. The next section suggests some possibilities. 
Facilitating Metacognitive Experiences for Young Children 
Flavell’s seminal paper on cognitive monitoring (Flavell 1979) outlined the conditions under which 
metacognitive experiences are most likely to occur. Firstly metacognitive experiences are more likely 
in situations which require ‘highly conscious thinking’. It would be worth recording how many tasks 
young children are asked to do in learning situations which actually require them to consciously 
think about what they are doing. Secondly, metacognitive experiences are more likely to occur in 
new situations which require planning and evaluation. For some learners of all ages, such situations 
would give rise to very stressful metacognitive experiences which rather than developing 
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metacognition could give rise to unhelpful metacognitive knowledge and have a debilitating effect 
on motivation. Clifford (1991)speaks of adventurous and cautious learners. Whilst the former relish 
challenge and are resilient in the face of negative emotions, the latter seek out less challenging 
opportunities and find negative emotions aroused by not accomplishing goals as debilitating. Thirdly 
metacognitive experiences are more likely where decisions and actions are authentic and carry some 
risk. Some nursery schools foster such decision making quite well however, as children move 
through the education system the content curriculum can constrain the opportunity to experience 
‘weightly and risky’ decisions. The final element of Flavell’s conditions under which metacognitive 
experiences should occur is in situations which are not highly emotionally charged and where 
extraneous factors are not impinging to the extent that they inhibit reflective thinking. Thus whilst 
metacognitive experiences give rise to emotions, they are most likely to occur when the external 
emotional climate is controlled.  
Research has shown that collaborative group learning enables learners to pick up cues from the 
verbal and non verbal metacognitive experiences of their co-learners. The monitoring of these cues 
can lead to shared metacognitive experiences and to shared and co-regulation, (Iiskala, Vauras, & 
Lehtinen, 2004; Salonen, Vauras, & Efklides, 2005). However, as my own research into 5 and 6 year 
olds collaborating on writing tasks has shown, when left unsupported these metacognitive 
experiences do not necessarily result in more metacognitive behaviour. I found that high levels of 
social co-operation, support and collaborative talk ie. what would look like ‘good partnership work’ 
in a classroom setting did not always lead to metacognition. Some elements of collaborative 
partnerships which did give rise to metacognitive behaviour were task oriented motivation; co-
operative rather than competitive interaction; attention to task instructions; degree of joint 
ownership of the task; periods of talk interspersed with silence and periods of writing and emotional 
stability or calmness (Larkin, 2009). 
In order to create metacognitive experiences for young learners, adults need to deliberately 
structure situations which are more likely to give rise to such experiences. There are many 
commercially available thinking skills programmes which include some elements of metacognition. 
However, these have not all been empirically tested and researched. One programme designed for 
5-6 year olds which is based on sound theoretical principles and which has undergone research 
evaluation is the Let’s Think programme (Adey, Robertson, & Venville, 2001). Evaluation showed 
that overall Let’s Think! has significant effects on children’s cognitive ability (Adey, Robertson, & 
Venville, 2002). There are four basic features or pillars of any CASE programme: cognitive conflict; 
social construction; metacognition; bridging/transfer. 
Cognitive conflict refers to presenting children with something puzzling or unexpected. This is not 
simply a matter of presenting difficult or challenging material. Rather it is about providing 
experiences which confound children’s thinking; which make them reflect and think again about 
what they appear to know. Creating cognitive conflict is likely to lead to metacognitive experiences 
as children feel puzzled, experience difficulty and frustration. Many of the Let’s Think tasks for 5-6 
year olds are based on open ended questions ie. there is no one right answer but different answers 
can be equally valid. This more closely resembles real world problems and whilst the activities may 
be based on schemata such as categorization and seriation they are contextualised by narrative 
stories. For example one task involves children inventing a game using all the materials provided:  a 
ball, a die and shaker and a hula hoop. The cognitive conflict comes through trying to use all of the 
Shirley Larkin 2013 
 
apparatus; ensuring that all members of the group of six children are involved in the process; 
creating a game which is fair and reliable and managing conflicting feelings and ideas within the 
group. The children also have to be able to teach the game to another group, thus experiencing the 
role of tutor. 
Social Construction is described by Vygotsky (1979) as a process of semiotic mediation, which is 
dynamic and interactive and where knowledge is constructed through the manipulation of 
psychological tools, the most apparent of which is language. In the Let’s Think tasks children create 
and construct knowledge together in social groups; explaining and negotiating, learning to listen and 
to respond appropriately; knowing when to argue a point and when to accept another’s view. In 
order to facilitate social construction the classroom environment including the physical layout of the 
classroom; the number and type of resources allocated to the group and the make up of the group 
are factors in helping or hindering collaborative work. Metacognitive experiences are created 
through this social construction process. Children may feel that they are being overlooked, not taken 
seriously, that they have little to contribute or that they are too shy or embarrassed to put forward 
their own ideas. In order to create constructive metacognitive experiences in collaborative group 
work the adult needs to observe and respond to the verbal and non verbal cues of individuals within 
the group.  
The third pillar of CASE activities is metacognition. It is important that this is not seen as a simple 
reflection on learning at the end of an activity. Instead the fostering of metacognition through the 
creation of metacognitive experiences runs throughout the task from planning to evaluation. The 
Let’s Think activities meet the requirements set out by Flavell to stimulate metacognitive 
experiences. Making use of the metacognitive experiences which arise during these collaborative 
tasks requires the adult facilitator to create a learning space where failure to come up with an easy 
and right answer is seen as positive rather than negative; where difficulty is experienced as 
pleasurable rather than debilitating and where social nicety is not allowed to dominate the cognitive 
challenge. Young children are socialised to help, be kind to and share with others. Yet in problem 
solving tasks this can become an issue if children for example, give resources to another child 
because this is the “kind thing to do” rather than because this will help the group to solve the 
problem.  
The fourth pillar of CASE refers to bridging and transfer ie. the ability to use the knowledge 
constructed on one specific task and transfer that to other similar tasks or to other kinds of tasks. 
This requires an ability to abstract general principles from specific situations and reapply them in 
new situations. In terms of metacognitive experiences the successful transfer of learning from one 
domain to another is likely to produce feelings of satisfaction and empowerment. The positive 
metacognitive experiences arising from successful transfer of learning is likely to lead to new 
thinking; to develop the metacognitive knowledge base and to enhance regulation and control of 
thinking. 
Attribution of cause and outcome of emotions and how they might be regulated are likely to differ 
amongst a group of learners just as the strength of the emotions felt will differ  (Graesser, D'Mello, & 
Person, 2009) and it is important that teachers are able to respond to these different emotions 
appropriately. Many teachers do this instinctively but teacher training programmes rarely focus on 
how emotion and feelings might affect learning. Understanding the importance of metacognitive 
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experiences for young children and how to facilitate them may go someway towards reinstating the 
importance of feelings in early years’ education. 
 
References 
Adey, P., Robertson, A., & Venville, G. (2001). Let's Think! A Programme for Developing Thinking in 
Five and Six Year Olds. Slough: Nfer Nelson. 
Adey, P., Robertson, A., & Venville, G. (2002). Effects of a cognitive acceleration programme on Year 
1 pupils. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 72, 1-25. 
Blair, C., & Razza, R. P. (2007). Relating Effortful Control, Executive Function, and False Belief 
Understanding to Emerging Math and Literacy Ability in Kindergarten. Child Development, 
78(2), 647-663. 
Borkowski, J. G., & Thorpe, P. K. (1994). Self-Regulation and Motivation: A Life-Span Perspective on 
Underachievement. In D. H. Schunk & B. J. Zimmerman (Eds.), Self-regulation of learning and 
performance: Issues and educational applications (pp. 45-100). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Brandl, J. L. (2012). Pretend play in early childhood: the road between metalism and behaviourism. 
In M. J. Beran, J. L. Brandl, J. Perner & J. Proust (Eds.), Foundations of Metacognition (pp. 
146-166). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Brown, A. L. (1987). Metacognition, Executive Control, Self-Regulation and Other More Mysterious 
Mechanisms. In F. E. Weinert & R. H. Kluwe (Eds.), Metacognition, Motivation and 
Understanding (pp. 65-116). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Carpendale, J. I., & Chandler, M. J. (1996). On the Distinction between False Belief Understanding 
and Subscribing to an Interpretive Theory of Mind. Child Development, 67, 1686-1706. 
Cavanaugh, J. C., & Borkowski, J. G. (1980). Searching for metamemory-memory connections.  A 
developmental study. Developmental Psychology, 16, 441-453. 
Clifford, M. M. (1991). Risk taking: Theoretical, empirical and educational considerations. 
Educational Psychologist, 26, 263-298. 
Dermitzaki, I., & Efklides, A. (2001). Age and gender effects on students' evaluations regarding the 
self and task-related experiences in mathematics. In S. Volet & S. Jarvela (Eds.), Motivation in 
learning contexts: Conceptual advances and methodological implications (pp. 271-293). 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Efklides, A. (2001). Metacognitive experiences in problem solving: Metacognition, motivation and 
self regulation. In A. Efklides, J. Kuhl & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Trends and prospects in 
motivation research (pp. 297-323). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. 
Efklides, A. (2006). Metacognition and affect: What can metacognitive experiences tell us about the 
learning process? Educational Research Review, 3-14. 
Esken, F. (2012). Early forms of metacognition in human children. In M. J. Beran, J. L. Brandl, J. 
Perner & J. Proust (Eds.), Foundations of Metacognition (pp. 134-145). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Estes, D. (1998). Young Children's Awareness of Their Mental Activity:The Case of Mental Rotation. 
Child Development, 69(5), 1345-1360. 
Flavell. (1976). Metacognitive aspects of problem solving. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), The Nature of 
Intelligence (pp. 231-235). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Flavell. (1979). Metacognition and Cognitive Monitoring. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906-911. 
Flavell, & Wellman, H. M. (1977). Metamemory. In R. V. Kail & J. W. Hagen (Eds.), Perspectives on the 
development of memory and cognition (pp. 3-33). Hillsdale: Erlbaum. 
Garrett, A. J., Mazzocco, M. M. M., & Baker, L. (2006). Development of the Metacognitive Skills of 
Prediction and Evaluation in Children With or Without Math Disability. Learning Disabilities 
Research & Practice, 21(2), 77-88. 
Shirley Larkin 2013 
 
Graesser, A. C., D'Mello, S., & Person, N. (2009). Meta-Knowledge in Tutoring. In D. J. Hacker, J. 
Dunlosky & A. C. Graesser (Eds.), Handbook of Metacognition in Education (pp. 361-382). 
New York: Routledge. 
Hart, J. T. (1992). Memory and the Feeling of Knowing Experience. In T. O. Nelson (Ed.), 
Metacognition: Core Readings (pp. 133-141). Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
Higgins, S., Hall, E., Baumfield, V., & David Moseley. (2005). A meta-analysis of the impact of the 
implementation of thinking skills approaches on pupils. London: EPPI Centre, Social Science 
Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. 
Iiskala, T., Vauras, M., & Lehtinen, E. (2004). Socially shared metacognition in peer learning? Hellenic 
Journal of Psychology, 1, 147-178. 
Jacobs, G. M. (2004). A Classroom Investigation of the Growth of Metacognitive Awareness in 
Kindergarten Children through the Writing Process. Early Childhood Education Journal, 32(1), 
17-23. 
Kornell, N., Son, L. K., & Terrace, H. S. (2007). Transfer of Metacognitive Skills and Hint Seeking in 
Monkeys. Psychological Science, 18(1), 64-71. 
Larkin, S. (2007). A phenomenological analysis of the metamemory of 5-6 year old children. 
Qualitative Research in Psychology, 4(4), 281-293. 
Larkin, S. (2009). Socially mediated metacognition and learning to write. Thinking Skills and 
Creativity, 4, 149-159. 
Larkin, S. (2010). Metacognition in Young Children. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Lewis, M. (2003). The development of self-consciousness. In J. Roessler & M. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and 
self-awareness: Issues in philosophy and psychology (pp. 275-295). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1992). Metamemory: A Theoretical Framework and New Findings. In T. 
O. Nelson (Ed.), Metacognition Core Readings (pp. 117-129). MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The Psychology of the Child (H. Weaver, Trans.). London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. 
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimapanzee have a theory of mind ? Behavioural and 
Brain Sciences, 1, 515-526. 
Reddy, V. (2001). Infant Clowns. Enfance, 247-256. 
Reddy, V. (2003). On being the object of attention: Implications for self-other consciousness. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 7(9), 397-402. 
Rochat, P. (2004). The infant's world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Salonen, P., Vauras, M., & Efklides, A. (2005). Social interaction: What can it tell us about 
metacognition and co-regulation in learning? European Psychologist, 10, 199-205. 
Schneider, W., & Pressley, M. (1997). Memory Development Between Two and Twenty (2nd ed.). 
Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Smith, J. D., Shields, W. E., & Washburn, D. A. (2003). The comparative psychology of uncertainty 
monitoring and metacognition. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 26(3), 317-373. 
van der Zee, T., Hermans, C., & Aarnoutse, C. (2006). Primary school students' metacognitive beliefs 
about religious education. Educational Research and Evaluation, 12(3), 271-293. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wertsch, J. V. (1978). Adult-child interaction and the roots of metacognition. Quarterly Newsletter of 
the Institute for Comparative Human Development, 2, 15-18. 
 
 
